

Simulation Assisted Requirements and Systems Engineering

Conciliating Safety, Innovation and Engineering Efficiency

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Who Am I?



- 1975 - 1994: Software engineer and architect in the **general software industry**
- 1994 - 2021: Senior research engineer at **EDF** on **digital I&C systems**
 - Since 1994: **Formal software verification**
 - Since 1999: **FPGAs** for safety applications
 - Since 2007: **Simulation assisted requirements and systems engineering**
 - Since 2016: **NUWARD** I&C architect
 - SMR co-designed by EDF, CEA, Technicatome and Naval Group
- Since June 2021: Retired
 - But still active on my favourite subjects of interest

Context

- Nuclear power plants need to be economically **competitive**
 - In the face of increasingly cost-effective other sources of energy
- Nuclear must **innovate** while still ensuring high safety levels
 - In a world-wide market but non-harmonized nuclear regulatory landscape
- To this end, **efficient** engineering is a necessity
 - All along power plants life cycle, from conceptual studies to deconstruction

Systems Engineering (SE) is Important

- Complex systems cannot be understood by **single** teams and disciplines
 - **Coordination** of many is necessary
- The later an error is revealed, the more expensive and severe the consequences



and also Logistics, Geography, Weather & Climate, Prospective studies, ...

Requirements Engineering (RE) is Important

- Defence against CCF

- Faults in requirements could defeat redundancy, defence-in-depth and diversity (even with functional diversity)

- Confirmed by studies with EPRI

- For 1E I&C systems, faults in requirements are several times more frequent than faults in software

- Confirmed by OECD COMPSIS

“Weaknesses in requirements are one of the most significant contributors to systems and software failing to meet the intended goals. A better analysis is needed to understand the software’s interfaces with the rest of the system and discrepancies between the documented requirements for a correct functioning system.”

[OECD COMPSIS Project Report – Nov 2011]

- Confirmed by events from all industrial sectors

- E.g., the civil aviation industry

Need for Improvements in RE & SE

● Dissatisfaction with most mainstream RE approaches

- Do not address requirements **elicitation** and **validation**
- Do not address requirements **meaning** and **semantics**
- Need to take full account of systems **operational environment**

● Dissatisfaction also with most mainstream SE approaches

- Do not **fully** address development
- Do not address **operation**
- Do not address **complexity**
- Do not address **RE**
- Ignore techniques as fundamental as **simulation**
- Ignore needs as essential as **maintenance of engineering and safety knowledge** about a system all along its life time

Defects in Requirements

● Inadequacy

- Where, in some situations, what is specified is woefully **inappropriate**

● Ambiguity

- Where different people concerned could **interpret** what is specified **differently**

● Apathy

- Where there is **no difference** between what is **genuinely needed** and what is **barely tolerated**

● Over-ambition

- Where what is specified leads to **excessive complexity**

● Over-specification

- Where what is specified is not the problem but **a technical solution**

● Intangibility

- Where what is specified has no concrete, verifiable acceptance criteria


● Impossibility

- Where what is specified is **not achievable**

Rigorous Requirements Engineering

- To eliminate these defects, one needs to consider the **meaning** of requirements
- For large and complex systems, **manual verification is ineffective and insufficient**
- **Tool-supported verification** needs requirements to be **formally specified**
 - **Simulation**, formal verification
 - But models must also be **understood by all those concerned**


- To avoid over-specification, need for **constraint-based** requirements specification



- Requirements adequacy depends on **assumptions**
- A requirement may be adequate in some **situations**, but not in others
 - Need to explore the set of situations the system may face during its life time

Modelling

● Many different types of models



- Geometric & Topological models
- Geographic models
- Engineering databases
- ...

Other forms of modelling

MESKAAL: Maintenance of the Engineering and Safety Knowledge about a system All Along its Life time

● Modelling thriftiness


● Model-assisted teams coordination

BASAALT in a Nutshell

- Modelling modularity

- Keeping track of engineering progress along life time
- Enabling teams coordination
- Expressing system decomposition

- Models used for development are an investment for operation, upgrades and deconstruction



Prospective studies
Conceptual design
Basic design

Requirements
Architecture
Detailed design

Construction, Retrofit, Upgrade

Commissioning
Validation
Integration
Unit testing

Operation


Diagnostics
Prognostics
Optimisation
Outage Planning

Deconstruction

Data assimilation
Data reconciliation
Faster than RT simulation
Reverse time simulation
Operation optimisation
Simulation-based training

FORM-L in a Nutshell

Determiners



Behavioural Items

Variables (Booleans, statecharts, Integers, Reals, quantities, Strings)

Events

Sets (of items or of values)

Properties, Assumptions, Objectives, Requirements, Guarantees, Guards

Objects (static, or dynamic creation / deletion)

Time Domains (in Newtonian time)

One single **Continuous Time Domain** for physical processes & human actions

Multiple **Discrete Time Domains** for Globally Asynchronous but Locally Synchronous (GALS) digital systems


Elementary Instructions



What, How, How well

- Dynamic object creation
- Dynamic object deletion
- Assignments

<i>A posteriori</i> constraints	Invariance	Achievement
Operation-time constraints	Invariance constraints	Achievement constraints
Systematic constraints	<i>ensure</i>	<i>achieve</i>
Capability constraints	<i>assert X, Y</i> <i>can ensure</i>	<i>assert X, Y</i> <i>can achieve</i>




Composite Instructions

Time exclusion	Sequence
Set exclusion	Concurrency
Selection	Iteration
(Boolean or probabilistic)	

Interfaces (coordination, co-simulation)


Contracts (Engineered, mutually agreed interfaces between concerned parties)



Encroachments (Undesired, forceful failure propagation)

Bindings (enabling co-simulation of FORM-L models developed independently or with non FORM-L models)

Example of Envelope Electric Voltage at a Power Supply Terminals




Example of Envelope Electric Voltage at a Power Supply Terminals

```
mps.voltage begin
  private Event eMicroCut "Micro cuts or false hopes": rate is 3/mn;
  from t0 repeat sequence
    during random (1, 10)*mn
      from eMicroCut during random (0.1, 10)*s Assumption microCut is
        ensure derivative in [-1000, 1000]*V/s
      otherwise Assumption normalTension is
        ensure value in [210, 260]*V and derivative in [-10, 10]*V/s;
    during random (0.1, 10)*s Assumption transition is
      ensure derivative in [-1000, 1000]*V/s;
    during random (5, 60)*mn
      from eMicroCut during random (0.1, 10)*s Assumption falseHope is
        ensure derivative in [-1000, 1000]*V/s
      otherwise Assumption noTension is
        ensure value in [ 0, 150]*V and derivative in [-100, 100]*V/s;
  end sequence;
end mps.voltage;
```


Justification Framework in a Nutshell

- May be used to express in a structured manner the **rationales** behind decisions
 - Can express rigorous and objective, **qualitative** and **subjective** aspects
 - More informative than simple traceability links
- Complementary to the modelling framework
 - ISO - IEC - IEEE 15026-2 (2011)
 - EURATOM project HARMONICS (Harmonised Assessment of Reliability of MOdern Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Software, 2011-2015)




Simulation of Constraint-Based Models

- Tools like **StimuLus** can randomly generate any number of different test cases consistent with **definitions** and **constraints**
 - To automatically explore large sets of possible situations arising from the **full operational context**
 - Taking account of **normal** and **failure** behaviours
 - Including human actions and errors




Simulation of Constraint-Based Reference Models

- Tools like **StimuLus** can randomly generate any number of different test cases consistent with **definitions** and **assumptions**
- **Scenario Models** may be used to guide the generator towards cases of interest
- **Coverage criteria** may be used to help ensure that models are sufficiently tested



Simulation of Constraint-Based Solution Models

- Solution models may be **validated step-by-step** against the requirements of earlier models
- Even for relatively simple systems, the number of cases to consider is a **challenge** for purely manual techniques
- Automated verification may be reapplied at limited cost and delay **after each modification**
- **Alternative solutions** (optimisation) may also be assessed at limited cost and delay



Conclusion

- BASAALT and FORM-L are still works in progress
 - Formal specification of FORM-L grammar and semantics
 - Development of translators towards existing modelling languages that already have support tools
 - E.g., StimuLus, Modelica, Scade, Figaro, ...
 - Development of variants other than the English variant
 - E.g., French, German, Swedish variants
 - Development of a graphical FORM-L representation
 - Development of appropriate test coverage criteria
 - Introduction of spatial locators in 3D, 2D and 1D spaces
 - Einsteinian, relativistic space-time could also be considered, but that could add significant complexity to the language

Thank you for your attention



Questions ?